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Abstract:  
A new paradigm for medical care is emerging which terms itself “personalized medicine”. Advocates claim that 
medical treatment can now be targeted on the specific characteristics of each individual, using genetic profiling to 
identify the particular nature of the condition, and to tailor treatments for each person. Further, they argue, the focus 
of medicine will move from treatment to prevention. It is claimed that genetic tests based on recent genomic research 
will enable doctors to identify susceptibilities for such common conditions before the onset of illness, and to target 
preventive intervention to reduce the individual and social burdens of ill health. Further, it is argued that genetic 
information will allow precision in the choice of drugs and doses, avoiding adverse reactions, minimising waste, 
reducing costs and increasing efficacy. Coupled with other advances, it is argued that the future of medicine should 
and will be “personalised, predictive and preventive.” Drawing on such developments, we have seen the growth of 
personal genomics companies marketing tests “direct to consumers” that claim to identify individual disease 
susceptibilities and to “empower” individuals by giving them the information—and the personal responsibility—to 
manage their own health. This paper critically assesses the promises made for personalized medicine, discusses some 
of the challenges for health policy, and considers the social and ethical implications of moving medical care towards 
such a personalized and individualized model. 
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Does the future of healthcare lie in “personalized medicine”?i Many in Europe and the US seem to 
think so. In these regions, theme of “personalization” is much in vogue from “personalizing” education to 
“personalizing” the internet.ii  The term is also central to proposals for the reform of the welfare state in 
the UK, where it refers to giving clients greater choice over what is offered to them— “putting people 
first” as a 2007 report termed it—putting the individual, rather than bureaucrats and professionals in 
control over planning their services.iii  For some, personalization means that markets should be developed 
in areas that were previously managed by state bureaucracies such as social housing or care for people 
with disabilities. They claim that markets “personalize” because they increase the power of the individual, 
giving them control of their own budgets and allowing them the choice between those who provide 
services. Others consider that “personalization” entails a whole person, whole life, whole systems
approach, where each individual's uniqueness is recognised and respected, and they are treated as a whole 
person by services.iv Some argue that personalization is a response to the rise of a new generation of 
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“empowered consumers”—individuals rejecting paternalism, loosing trust in authorities such as doctors 
and politicians, refusing to be told by authorities what is in their interests, and expecting that they are both 
able and entitled to make their own decisions about issues such as health care, pensions, insurance, care in 
old age and the like, as they do in relation to the purchase of consumer goods such as food, clothes or 
televisions. Individuals, it is claimed, no longer wish to be clients or recipients of services, passive 
citizens grateful for what the State gives them, they want to be active citizens, citizens as consumers. 
Some even suggest that the creation of such sovereign citizen-consumers is a form of liberation, which 
will promote dignity, and enhance well being, and even lead to progressive social change.v
The term personalization is so potent because of its capacity to “translate” —to adapt to so many 
different contexts and apparently desirable social and ethical values. In contemporary Western culture, at 
least, it seems obvious that no-one would want “impersonal” services, or “one size fits all” provisions; 
surely everyone wants to be treated as an individual, wants to have freedom of choice, their own decisions 
respected, to be treated as a whole, unique person responsible for their own life and their own health. And 
yet, as we shall see, things are not so simple, especially when it comes to medicine and healthcare. 
 
The social and ethical issues raised by the move to personalization in healthcare have been the subject 
of a recent two year study by the UK's Nuffield Council on Bioethics (the nearest the UK has to a national 
bioethics committee): its report was entitled Medical Profiling and Online Medicine: The Ethics of 
“Personalized Healthcare” in a Consumer Age (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2010).vi The Report points 
to a number of arguments from policy makers and politicians in favour of a more personalized health 
service. For example, in 2008, the Darzi Review of the UK's National Health Service, High Quality Care 
For All placed great emphasis on the need for “personalization” and “personalized” healthcare services, 
asserting that “Personalizing services means making services fit for everyone's needs, not just those of the 
people who make the loudest demands.”vii In the same year, the Secretary of State for Health promised a 
“personalised” National Health Service, asserting that “the days of a one-size-fits-all NHS are over.”viii 
The term is also in regular use in announcements of the benefits promised by genetic research in medicine: 
for example, in March 2010, the findings of a team at Oxford University were announced to much 
publicity under the headline “New cancer biomarker may herald personalized medicine.”ix
The Report focuses on a number of areas in which it seems that individuals, as “freely choosing” 
consumers, are gaining direct access to medical information and/or to medical treatments previously 
provided via a public healthcare system staffed by professionals, seemingly increasing their choice and 
enhancing their control over their own health and illness. In this paper, I wish to focus on just one aspect: 
the use of genomic profiling of individuals to make predictions about disease susceptibility and to make 
decisions about the choice of treatment. 
 
First, however, we should note that medicine and health care pose two problems for advocates of 
personalization. On the one hand, almost all the major advances in human health have come from 
interventions that have been anything but personal. Clean water, effective sewage systems, regulation of 
food safety, controls on environmental pollutants, together with population wide programmes of 
vaccination, maternity services and similar measures are effective precisely because they address the 
underpinnings of ill health without differentiating individuals, except where they focus on specific groups, 
such as pregnant women and new born babies. They are based on the idea that disease can target anyone, 
that risks are spread across a population and therefore must be tacked at that level. The programmes of 
health and social insurance that began to take shape in Europe in the late nineteenth century, and 
developed across the first half of the twentieth century, with their embedded principles of solidarity and 
social citizenship, were predicated on the belief that risks were essentially shared among all, thus each 
should contribute equally, because any person might be unfortunate enough to require benefit. No-one has 
put this more clearly than William Beveridge, in 1942, in his Report on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services:x
 It has been found to accord best with the sentiments of the British people that in insurance 
organised by the community by use of compulsory power, each individual should stand in on 
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the same terms; none should claim to pay less because he is healthier or has more regular 
employment...  The term “social insurance” to describe this institution implies both that it is 
compulsory and that men stand together with their fellows. The term implies a pooling of 
risks except so far as separation of risks serves a social purpose. 
This same rationale that underpinned the idea of a universal National Health Service free at the point of 
delivery. Impersonalization was the route to improved health for all.  
On the other hand, many medical practitioners claim that, as far as the direct provision of medical care 
to individuals is concerned, medicine—or at least good medicine—has always been personalized. The 
good clinician, it is argued, always takes account of what he or she knows of the form of life of the patient, 
their family history, their living conditions, their other diseases and aliments, their character and 
personality—this, some claim, is real personalized medicine. Of course, traditional Chinese medicine has 
always been personalized in this sense. Yet the experience of Western medicine for many patients has 
indeed been of a kind of demeaning impersonalization—one in which they are prescribed a drug on the 
basis that it works for a majority of those in a clinical trial, not because it works for them, where they are 
treated as merely the bearer of a diseased organ, rather than a person in need of treatment, regarded as a 
mere “case” of cancer, diabetes or depression, and not as an individual. 
1. Personalized medicine—the advocates  
One of the main inspirations for the dream of personalized medicine has theHuman Genome Project. In 
1992, Leroy Hood prophesied “Once the 100,000human genes have been identified” it would transform 
our ways of dealing with human diseases:xi
The genome project in the twenty-first century will have a profound impact on medicine, 
both for diagnosis and therapy. . .  Perhaps the most important area of DNA diagnostics will 
be the identification of genes that predispose individuals to disease. However, many such 
diseases— cardiovascular, neurological, autoimmune—are polygenic; they are the result of 
the action of two or more genes. Human genetic mapping will permit the identification of 
specific predisposing genes and DNA diagnostics will facilitate their analysis in many 
different individuals.. .  Perhaps in twenty years [remember, he was writing in 1992] it will 
be possible to take DNA from newborns and analyze fifty or more genes for the allelic forms 
that can predispose the infant to many common diseases.. .  For each defective gene there 
will be therapeutic regimens that will circumvent the limitations of the defective gene. Thus 
medicine will move from a reactive mode. . .  to a preventive mode. Preventive medicine 
should enable most individuals to live a normal, healthy, and intellectually alert life without 
disease.  
 
In 2011, almost twenty years later, these predictions have failed to materialise. Human genomics has 
proved exceptionally complex, not least because we now know that the number of coding sequences in the 
human genome is closer to 20,000. Hood, however, is still optimistic: “I think we'll see a shift from 
reactive medicine to proactive medicine. I define it as ‘P4’ medicine—powerfully predictive, personalized, 
preventative...  and participatory....  Individual genomes will become a standard of medical records in 10 
years or so, and we will have the power to make inferences [about an individual's health] when combined 
with phenotypic information. Then we can begin to plan strategies for individual health care in ways we 
have never done before... .  If we have patients in 10 years with billions of data points, being able to 
compare that with individual genotype phenotype correlations will give us deep and fundamental new 
insights into predictive medicine.. . Medicine is going to become an information science.”xii
Many other biomedical researchers, policy makers and pressure groups continue to express hopes for a 
brave new genomic future which will “personalize” medicine. Genomics, they claim, will enable the 
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tailoring of treatments to the genomic basis of each individual's disease-pharmacogenomics. And 
genomics will not only allow individual diseases to be correctly diagnosed, it will also allow future 
diseases to be predicted in advance for each individual prior to any symptoms on the basis of patterns of 
genomic variation. Medicine will become predictive and preventive—it will be possible at birth or soon 
after to identify one's disease risks, and to intervene to reduce or eliminate them. Health services will no 
longer be “illness services” directed at populations as a whole. Predictive and preventive medicine will 
optimise the health of each individual. Writing in Nature, under the title “Has the revolution arrived?”, 
Frances Collins, director of the US National Institutes of Health, former director of the National Human 
Genome Research Institute and a long time advocate of personalization asserts that all the prediction she 
made for personalized medicine ten years ago have to some extent come true, and the promise of a 
revolution in health care “remains quite real” although suggesting that “we invariably overestimate the 
short-term impacts of new technologies, and underestimate their longer-term effects.”xiii
But this promised revolution raises many questions. Is it real or a mirage? What will be the 
consequences—medical and ethical? Is this a future that we desire? 
 
2. Pharmacogenomics? 
Pharmacogenomics was based on the hope that a genomic assessment of the patient could aid both 
diagnosis and treatment.xiv
Actually pharmacogenomics does not provide individually tailored drugs. The genomic information 
allows the population to be divided into groups with different probabilities of responding to particular 
types of medication or developing an adverse reaction—one group has a high probability, another a lower 
probability, but for neither group is there certainty. The development of some rational principles for drug 
choice, would certainly be welcome in some areas, for example in psychiatry, where, in conditions such as 
depression, over a dozen drugs are available, with different efficacy and side effects in different patients, 
and only trial and error to guide the physician. However at present, with very few exceptions, 
pharmacogenomics has not delivered the genetic information that would enable such a choice to be made.  
 Rather than using “blockbuster” drugs, or choosing between different drugs for 
the same condition on the basis of accumulated experience, it was hoped that genetic information could 
identify the specific molecular basis of the condition which was ailing the individual patient, and help the 
doctor choose the right drug at the right dose for that specific individual. The hope was that this would 
ensure efficacy, compliance, accuracy of dosage; minimize adverse drug reactions (ADRs) and so 
eliminate much waste. For example, in the UK, some estimate that up to 50% of the drug budget of over 
£7 million is not efficiently spent — partly because the patients do not take their drugs, partly because the 
drugs are not effective for a particular patient, and partly due to ADRs — much of which may be due to 
failure of drug to match genotype. However, as yet, the promise of pharmacogenomics has yet to be 
delivered. 
Even if it was possible, the segmentation of the disease population into groups on the basis of their 
probable response to different drugs is not without its problems. Should an individual be denied access to 
a drug—perhaps a very expensive drug—simply because those with a similar genotype have a lower 
probability of responding well or a higher probability of an adverse effect—especially if no other drug is 
available? Probability is not certainty, and someone excluded from even the slim chance of benefit may 
well feel injustice. Further, if one is concerned with equity in health treatment, the segmentation of the 
population in this way may have two important consequences. On the one hand, it is likely to lead doctors 
in the developed world to move away from cheap generic drugs, out of patent, towards new, expensive, 
patented drugs prescribed through use of pharmacogenomic data, that are not available or affordable in 
most parts of the world. On the other, the development of drugs whose efficacy is specific to particular 
population groups will no doubt give further incentives, if they were needed, for pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in products for the most valuable markets, not the medical needs of those who suffer 
from the most prevalent diseases. Hence the fear of a new kind of racial segmentation of medicine. 
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At present, drugs are approved on the basis of clinical trials on large populations. Pharmacogenomics 
challenges this methodology, for it implies that some drugs will work only on specially selected specific 
subgroup of patients. We are already seeing one consequence, expensive for health care systems and 
profitable for drug companies. This is the licensing of drugs for use only following a genetic test 
indicating their efficacy in a particular patient group. Take, for example, Bristol Meyer Squibb's drug 
Erbitux (cetuximab), a very expensive drug for treating late stage colorectal cancer. In 2006, the UK's 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence did not approve this drug for use on the National 
Health Service because, at a cost of over£ 11,000 for an average extension of life of 5 months, this “was 
not compatible with the best use of NHS resources.” However it is approved in the US, but the Federal 
Drug Authority recommend a genetic diagnostic test before it can be prescribed to identify those 
individuals who have a high chance of responding well to the drug. This form of “personalization” thus 
creates an important opportunity for those who market genetic tests, but one that greatly increases 
healthcare costs. If such tests move into regular clinical practice, it will also increase the well known 
problems of communicating and storing genetic information, as in many cases such tests explore the 
genomic basis of the disease itself, providing information on the genetic susceptibility of an individual—
and hence of family members. The promise of personalization via pharmacogenomics is more problematic 
than its advocates often suggest.  
3. Susceptibility  
Pharmacogenomics was one part of the “personalising” revolution in healthcare; however the principal 
focus of those who advocate personalized, predictive and preventive medicine is now disease 
susceptibility.xv
Now of course, there is much useful biomedical research going on using these GWAS technologies: 
with discoveries of associations of genomic variation in over a dozen conditions from celiac disease to 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis in one year alone (2007). And many claim that it is via this route that we will 
finally be able to identify individual susceptibilities, using the complex algorithms suggested by those 
such as Leroy Hood. However many scientific criticisms have been made of this approach, often from 
those most closely involved—for poorly defined phenotypes, poor study designs, and, perhaps most 
important, for failing to emphasise the low utility of the associations found for assessing the risks of 
 Those involved with the Human Genome Project had high hopes that they would discover 
the genomic basis of common complex disorders such as diabetes or heart disease. But the reality proved 
much more complicated. No single gene, and no combination of a few genetic variations, was discovered 
that would account for such conditions. Thus the focus of genomic research shifted to explore more 
complex patterns of variations among single nucleotides-the so called SNPs—where one can identify the 
substitution of one base for another—G for C, for example—in a coding sequence for a protein. The 
method of choice for identifying these patterns of genomic variation at the molecular level is the Genome 
Wide Association Study (GWAS), and its method is simple to describe. Take 1000 persons diagnosed 
with a condition—say Type One Diabetes—the cases. Take 1000 persons without the diagnoses — the 
controls. Take samples of blood or saliva from these individuals, sequence relevant parts of their genome 
using a fast throughput gene chip devised for the purpose by Affymetrix or one of their rivals. Put all the 
information into a computer programme that will identify the SNPs that are present with significantly 
greater frequency in the cases than in the controls. Then you have some grounds, it is argued, for 
believing that this pattern of SNPs—perhaps variations at dozens, even hundreds, of locations on the 
genome—increases the likelihood of an individual developing this disorder. And from there you can go in 
a number of ways. You can try and work out the functional significance of these variations to identify the 
disease process itself. Or you can turn this SNP pattern into a genetic test, examine the genomes of those 
who are not ( yet) affected by the disease in question, and estimate their risk of developing the disease—
their susceptibility. Or more precisely, estimate the extent to which their risk of developing the disease 
over a lifetime is greater or smaller than the average risk in the population from which they come. 
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developing complex diseases (effect sizes of the new loci found are modest or small).xvi To complicate 
things, other variations also seem to play their part, notably copy number variations but also the rather 
obscure world of RNA and much more. Some now argue that where family history shows a pattern of 
heritability for complex diseases, this arises from a unique patterns of variation shared among family 
members, and but not shared with others diagnosed with “the same condition.”xvii
4. Personal genomics  
 And the risks conferred 
vary with population group, with lifestyle and many other factors whose effects are hard to quantify. For 
most common complex disorders, the genetic basis, if that is indeed the right word, lies in the highly 
complex interactions of many “genes of small effect,” each of which may, in combinations with others, 
and in certain biographical and environmental conditions, increase or decrease risk by a small percentage. 
This is why, in the realm of public health services, these developments in gene sequencing for common 
complex disorders remain at the research stage, and have not been translated into the clinical domain. The 
same is not true in the commercial world of what has become termed “personal genomics.” 
Many governments and health services offer genetic tests to certain groups—tests for couples with a 
high risk of having children with serious genetic diseases, heel prick tests for newborns and so forth. 
Choice of tests and relevant groups, access to the tests, and the interpretation of results is in the hands of 
medical professionals and public health officials. But about 10 years ago, companies began to offer 
genetic tests direct to individuals on a commercial basis, usually based on a genetic analysis of a sample 
of saliva sent by post, and to provide those individuals with information on their risks for various complex 
diseases, such as cancer, diabetes, and even neurodegenerative conditions such as Parkinson's disease. 
These companies have been challenged for many reasons, in part because they appear to be providing 
medically relevant information, and thus advising people on medical decisions. Partly as a result, and no 
doubt promoted by the fear of litigation, the companies all state, in small print on their websites, that the 
information should not be acted on to make medical decisions. However this claim is disingenuous. Here 
are some examples quoted in the Nuffield Report: 23andMe:”Find out if you carry inheritable markers for 
diseases such as breast cancer, cystic fibrosis, and Tay-Sachs.. . Learn your genetic risk for type 2 diabetes, 
Parkinson's disease, and other conditions.”xviii deCODEme: “Calculate your genetic risk for 50 diseases 
and traits... ” xix  Graceful Earth: “Check your future susceptibility BEFORE symptoms occur... Pre-
emptive insight into one's genetic predisposition can empower and allow for pro-active prevention.”xx 
Navigenics: “Knowing your genetic predispositions for important health conditions is an investment in 
your health. By gaining insight into these predispositions, you have the power to help delay the onset of 
conditions, detect them earlier, or prevent them altogether.”xxi
But does this information have clinical relevance for the individual who purchases these services? 
While for monogenetic diseases, genetic information can provide important evidence as to the likelihood 
of future illness, it is doubtful whether, for the foreseeable future, this kind of genomic information will 
have any relevance for an individual's future risk of developing a complex, multi-genetic diseases. There 
are a number of reasons for this. First, lack of validity: in most cases the level of prediction is low, and the 
variations in individual risk levels above or below those for the population are small and medically 
insignificant. However risk predictions are remarkably difficult to communicate and to understand, and 
thus individuals may believe that their level of risk is greater or more certain than it is. Second, lack of 
reliability: there are considerable variations in results between different companies offering the tests—
some individuals who have submitted their samples to several companies have found quite remarkable 
variations in the risk assessments provided. Third, lack of utility: even if the risk assessment is accurate 
and reliable, in almost all cases, there are no potential form of intervention available, and hence the advice 
that can be given to the individual in question is banal and hardly “empowering” — maintain a healthy 
diet, a healthy lifestyle, don't smoke or drink to excess etc.  
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The marketing of genomic information on a consumer basis direct to individuals also raises other 
problematic issues. There is no need for a medical professional to order the test—hence these 
developments are part of a growing “de-professionalization” of the doctor, in which the medical 
professional is no longer gatekeeper of services. There is no medical professional on hand to interpret the 
results—but the results do not speak for themselves and risk estimates need interpreting in the light of the 
specificity of the patient's life, age, lifestyle and so forth. Without such interpretation and individual 
discussion, such risk assessments may lead to unnecessary anxiety or complacency—false negatives and 
false positives. They may result in individuals rushing to a doctor demanding further tests or treatment, 
imposing unnecessary costs on public health care system—already an issue with patients bringing 
information from the internet to their doctors, contest in diagnoses or making their own diagnosis. And, of 
course, they pose well known problems about protection of privacy of information, and unexpected 
implications, for example in relation to medical insurance, if individuals receive findings that seem to 
show that they are at significantly elevated risk for a condition. Nonetheless, personal genomics has 
become a powerful and growing business model, and one that makes great ethical claims. Thus 23andMe 
claims that it “democratizes' genetics,” xxiiixxii and that it “was founded to empower individuals”  and 
deCODEme says “We need to empower people—if a genetic test prompts patients to do what is right for 
them then we have accomplished our goal.”xxiv
The Nuffield Report sets out five core values to evaluate such endeavours: private information should 
be safeguarded; individuals should be able to pursue their own interests in their own way; the state should 
act to reduce harm; public resources should be used fairly and efficiently; social solidarity (sharing risks 
and working together to protect the vulnerable) should inform public policy. The view of the report was 
that “these ethical values often conflict with one another. All are important and no one value ‘trumps' 
another.” The Report, therefore, sought to “soften” these conflicts through its recommendations. Now it is 
obvious that that people have long had access to misleading or false information on health and disease 
from many sources—books, magazines, and now on the internet. So is the harm here, in the case of 
genetic information, and indeed other on-line health information, sufficiently great, or sufficiently novel, 
to warrant new regulation? The Report was cautious about proposing increased regulation where harm had 
not been demonstrated, but nonetheless argued for tighter control over the claims made on the websites, 
for government oversight and information on the risks and benefits of personal genetic profiling, 
including the relevance for insurance and for doctors to receive training on giving advice to patients about 
commercial genetic profiling services. Further, it recommended that personal genomics companies should 
not knowingly analyze the DNA of children unless certain criteria are met, and that they should 
voluntarily provide clear information on the limitations of genetic profiling for decision making about 
health, lifestyles, susceptibility, and explain the meanings of the risk estimates that they provide. 
 How should regulators respond to these developments? 
However, I think there are some more general reasons for caution about the direction being taken by 
advocates of personalization based on genomics. First, let me make an obvious point: the focus of all this 
activity is on the diseases of affluence, not on the conditions that ail most people on our planet, curtailing 
their life expectancy, and bringing them to an early death. But, even in their own terms, these 
developments are troubling. Even if clear findings of genomic predispositions for common complex 
disorders — that is to say, biomarkers — were discovered by genome wide association studies, I suggest 
that we should long pause before we rush headlong into a medical future based on prediction and 
prevention. The very act of designating an individual “at risk” changes not only their own self perception, 
but also that of others—family members, educators, doctors, perhaps employers or insurers. In some cases, 
for example in psychiatric or neurodegenerative conditions, such designation, even if false, may lead to 
stigma or to an individual regarding every small event as indicative of impending doom. Further, early 
intervention into asymptomatic individuals on the basis of tests that may be unreliable, may over-predict 
future disease, and may lead to unnecessary medical intervention—no doubt increasing the market for risk 
reducing drugs—as we have already seen with the statins—but in the end, making everyone a “suitable 
case for treatment.” 
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Many experts are more pessimistic than Leroy Hood and Frances Collins about the clinical advances 
achievable through genomic research that searches for susceptibilities in the SNPs. While genome wide 
association studies may guide basic research on functional disease pathways, the risk levels that they 
identify for common complex disorders are low, and most now agree that non-genomic factors, from 
epigenetics, through environmental effects on gene expression, and the results of environmental and 
biographical factors, are of great importance in the development of common complex disorders, and their 
mode of action is far from understood. The science itself—not the well known criticisms of 
“geneticization” from social scientists—seems likely to thwart the initial hopes of finding clear predictive 
indicators and biomarkers for susceptibility and treatment targets for such disorders. For what genomics 
shows is, to put it simply, that at the molecular level, no one is normal—everyone has a bunch of little 
anomalies and it is very hard to predict which of these, in which combinations, and in which 
circumstances, may impair health. The rush to personalize, to predict and to prevent, to intervene early on 
those who have no symptoms but are judged at risk on the basis of such tests, not only expands the scope 
of medicine in the developed world, but potentially diverts crucial resources from the health care of those 
who are really ill, or at risk of disease from well known environmental factors that must be tackled, not on 
the basis of personalization, but using precisely those impersonal, population wide, solidaristic social 
interventions that have proved so effective in the past. Rather than seeking to personalize and 
individualise, we would to better to focus our attention—and our research resources—on those forms of 
medical intervention and healthcare that are known to produce improved health for all, especially those 
who do not have access to expensive genomic tests and patented pharmaceuticals. 
5.  Conclusions  
The move to personalized medicine is part of three more general developments that seem to raise 
significant ethical challenges for those concerned with global biomedical ethics. These are the challenges 
of consumerization, responsibilization, and individualization of healthcare.  
5.1. Consumerization  
Much medical care in most countries involves an element of individual consumer choice of health 
related products purchased as commodities in a market—whether this be the purchase of over-the-counter 
medicines, herbal medicines, private therapies and indeed private consultations with doctors and private 
treatment in hospitals and clinics. And healthcare offers a very large and growing international market for 
pharmaceutical companies, purveyors of medical devices and many others. Healthcare has remained 
largely commercial in many jurisdictions, for example in the US, although even there, insurance based 
schemes have developed where individuals are grouped together, for example, as employees, for the 
purchase and provision of healthcare. However, in Europe at least, over the last century, socially 
organized insurance based schemes for provision of most medical care on a non commodity basis, 
regardless of individual ability to pay, became the norm, and indeed were a key element of the forms of 
social solidarity embodied in European welfare states. Such schemes came under criticism from the 1960s 
onwards, from a variety of sources—from feminists and radicals critical of the way in which power and 
control over health was taken from individuals and placed in the hands of paternalistic professionals who 
claimed to know better than people themselves; from those critical of a dependency culture; from those 
who pointed to the inequities and inefficiencies in such bureaucratic systems as opposed to the purported 
efficiency of markets and so forth. 
Increasingly, as individuals in developed countries have come to view themselves as consumers as 
much as citizens, perhaps as consumer-citizens, and as freedom of choice has become the norm, such 
demands have spread to medicine and healthcare. The internet has become a key medium for opening up 
such choice, not merely providing easily available, if often unreliable, information to potential consumers 
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without professional intermediaries, but also, as we have seen, offering services for sale “direct-to-
consumers.” To what extent can, and should, the individual be regarded as a consumer in relation to health, 
making individual choices in the market, among services and treatments offered as commodities for sale 
and purchase? No doubt in any specific case, there are specific issues at stake—for example, in the 
increasing use of internet pharmacies to supply drugs which may be illegal, harmful, counterfeit, or fake, 
and where the consumer may not be in possession of adequate or accurate knowledge about the effects, 
dosage and so forth. But more generally, what ethical issues are at stake where public services are turned 
into markets or quasi-markets, or where individuals increasingly opt out of public provision in favour of 
individually purchased services. How can we balance the values of individual choice against those of 
social solidarity, mutual obligation: the sense that it is the responsibility of each of us to care for—and 
contribute to—the health of others to whom we have no direct relationship.  
5.2. Responsibilization  
It is hard to argue against the idea that individuals should have some responsibility for their own health, 
and that of their families. Those who developed welfare state systems in Europe certainly did not want to 
remove such personal responsibility. And yet one of the major criticisms of European welfare states over 
the last decades of the twentieth century was that they had indeed undermined personal responsibility, 
with undesirable economic and moral consequences. Economically, this was leading to an ever greater 
cost of welfare and social security. It was argued, that this had moral consequences—the growth of a 
professional apparatus was taking away individual's control over their own lives and bodies, leading to 
dependency on the State, sapping individuals' initiative and sense of power over their destiny. Hence the 
theme of responsibilization became central to policy reform. Reformers from a range of different positions 
argued for changes that would diminish dependency and increase autonomy, giving individuals more 
control and more choice. At the same time, however, individuals were to be urged, even required, to take 
greater responsibility for their own health, welfare, and security and that of their families, and not to rely 
on the State and its professional apparatus for their security, welfare and health. In the UK, the 2002 
Wanless report Securing our future health: taking a long-term view “emphasised the importance of 
individuals taking some responsibility for their health and recommended that the relationship between 
health professionals and the public could be improved by the ‘development of improved health 
information to help people engage with their care in an informed way’.”
xxvii
xxviii
xxv In 2006, in a report entitled 
Our health, our care, our say, the Department of Health declared that patients would be “given more 
control over — and will take on greater responsibility for—their own health and well-being.”xxvi In 2009, 
a report from the King's Fund asserted that “individual responsibility for health and self-care are key 
themes in recent health policy development in England,”   and the NHS Constitution for England 
outlined some formal responsibilities applying both to healthy people and to patients of that service: “you 
should recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your own, and your family's good health 
and well-being, and take some personal responsibility for it.”  
Taking more personal responsibility for ones health, it seems, is both economically and ethically 
desirable—saving money and improving souls at the same time! But responsibility is a double edged 
sword. On the one hand it seems to give people more power as individuals, providing them with 
information, and enabling them to make the key choices about their healthcare and disease risks. But on 
the other hand, individuals are obliged to take this role, subject to new expectations about their skills and 
capacities to understand and manage the information, to choose between different options with their own 
costs and benefits, and to accept at least some of the consequences of their choices for their future health. 
They are obliged to manage almost all aspects of their lives in the name of health—diet, lifestyle, 
monitoring of risks by regular check-ups, perhaps now taking genetic tests and so forth. And they may 
feel guilt, or maybe regarded by others as in some way guilty, if they are unable or unwilling to do that—
Similar themes have been stressed in 
official health policy pronouncements in other countries. 
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culpable for their own future illnesses and those of their family, even if in reality there was little that they 
could do to prevent these—as, for example in most cases of degenerative disease or cancer. The other side 
of being persuaded that you have the power and responsibility to take control of your own health, is 
inescapably a feeling of failure if, despite all, you fall ill. They are placed in the uncomfortable position of 
having responsibility for an uncertain future, with limited ability to alter the outcomes.  
5.3. Individualization versus solidarity  
Let me conclude with some remarks on individualization. The major advances in healthcare outcomes 
in the developed world—to the extent that they cannot simply be attributed from poverty reduction and 
increasing education—have not come about through personalization and individualization, but from the 
reverse—from interventions that have been addressed to all—clean air, water, effective sewage systems, 
pure food, programmes of population wide vaccination and so forth. These have not merely been 
instrumentally effective, they have also embodied a more profound ethic—that when it comes to health 
and illness, each has a responsibility to all, no individual should be held culpable for their illness, or 
refused treatment because they cannot afford it, or because they have, in someway, brought it upon 
themselves. The National Health Service in England is perhaps the clearest embodiment of these 
principles at the level of a single country, and is often thought to show that such a rationale is not only 
ethically sound, but also medically effective. Of course, we know that such a rationale is difficult to put 
into practice. While those who invented the NHS believed that there was a finite demand for medical care, 
this has proved not to be the case. Demand is unlimited, because of the discovery or invention of new 
conditions that can be thought of as illnesses, the development of new and ever more expensive treatments 
especially for those who would previously have died—at the start and end of life and from diseases once 
thought terminal—and new senses of what conditions can legitimately be treated by doctors. The cost of 
medical treatment spirals, and all health services must find ways of limiting costs, which means, in effect, 
depriving some individuals of treatments that might extend their life because of the burden that this would 
impose on tax payers, or the diversion of resources from treatments for other conditions.  
Personalized medicine however challenges this ethic in more fundamental ways. If it is not incalculable 
fate, or bad choice of parents, that leads to illness, but an identifiable genetic anomaly, then individuals 
are not all in the same boat. Some are not only more at risk than others, but can be identified in advance as 
being more risky. This raises the question of equity—if I am in a low risk category, should I pay higher 
taxes for the entirely predictable illnesses of those at high risk—or should I opt out and insure myself, 
taking advantage of low rates on account of my genetic good fortune. Further, if I know, or could know, 
that I am at high risk, should I disclose this information or disguise it—the dilemma that those who work 
in the insurance industry refer to as “moral hazard” in which I would not enter into the insurance pool in 
good faith, leaving others to take responsibility for the costs of my failure to disclose. Indeed, the 
tendency in insurance in other areas, for example motor insurance, is in this direction—towards the 
“unpooling of risks” and the allocation of individuals to different risk pools depending on such factors as 
age, employment or geographical location. But the consequences of such “unpooling” of risk in the field 
of health and illness may well be a radical political and ethical shift away from the ethos of social 
medicine, with its emphasis on equity and social justice in the provision of healthcare. 
If our medical “imaginary”—our image of what healthcare should be—is “all about me” it may well 
have serious consequences for my willingness to pay for, let alone care about, the health of others who are 
not related to me—not just others in my town or my country, but others in far away and distant places. 
Perhaps it will change the ethical obligations we feel towards others from those based on solidarity to 
those based on charity. However, I do not want to end on such a gloomy note. Some older forms of 
solidarity are being eroded by the technological and social developments that I have traced, and perhaps it 
is inevitable that the rationales and practices for provision of medicine and healthcare will change 
alongside them. But what we see is not simple individualization, but, at least potentially, the growth of 
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new forms of community. On the contrary, we see at least the beginnings of new forms of solidarity, as 
embodied in the kinds of social networking that build communities of people afflicted by similar 
conditions. Indeed some of the personal genomic sites explicitly seek to foster such communities, notably 
23andMe,xxix although it is less clear whether this is for genuine ethical reasons or for those of commercial 
ambition. And so do other sites, such as Patients Like Me,xxx
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